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Abstract— With the ubiquitous computing of providing services 
and applications at anywhere and anytime, cloud computing is 
the best option as it offers flexible and pay-per-use based services 
to its customers. Nevertheless, security and privacy are the main 
challenges to its success due to its dynamic and distributed 
architecture, resulting in generating big data that should be 
carefully analysed for detecting network’s vulnerabilities.  In this 
paper, we propose a Collaborative Anomaly Detection 
Framework (CADF) for detecting cyber attacks from cloud 
computing environments. We provide the technical functions and 
deployment of the framework to illustrate its methodology of 
implementation and installation.  The framework is evaluated on 
the UNSW-NB15 dataset to check its credibility while deploying 
it in cloud computing environments. The experimental results 
showed that this framework can easily handle large-scale systems 
as its implementation requires only estimating statistical 
measures from network observations. Moreover, the evaluation 
performance of the framework outperforms three state-of-the-art 
techniques in terms of false positive rate and detection rate. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
     The term ‘cloud computing’ denotes a network of networks 
interconnected using internet services in which virtual shared 
servers offer the software, infrastructure, platform, services 
and other resources to customers anywhere and anytime [1]. 
Cloud computing produces a flexible computing model which 
permits firms and organisations to use and adapt their IT needs 
over the internet at a low cost of use and without any liability 
towards IT infrastructure and maintenance [2].   
 
    In the cloud computing environment, network-accessible 
resources are used as services. These services are categorised 
into three types of Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure 
as a Service (IaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS) models 
[2] [3] [4]. Firstly, a PaaS delivers to a user or organisation 
client applications using programming languages, libraries, 
services and tools which are supported by a PaaS provider’s 
infrastructure.  Then, an IaaS offers processing units, network 
capabilities and other fundamental computing resources via 
Virtual Machines (VMs) to service subscribers. Finally, a     
SaaS offers to a user or organisation on-demand applications 
and software services via a cloud infrastructure, avoiding the 
cost of buying and maintaining those applications. 
 
   Cloud executions often contain security mechanisms, 
typically available because of the data centralisation and 
global architecture. Cloud providers endeavour to secure the 
homogeneous resources of cloud architecture as much as 
possible [3]. However, several vulnerabilities are a result of 
the underlying technologies, for example, network systems, 
APIs, datacentres and virtual machines that considerably 
threaten the cloud architecture [2].  
 
    The architecture of cloud computing includes three layers: 
infrastructure, application and platform which execute its 
functionalities. Each layer faces particular vulnerabilities, 
developed by diverse malicious scripts or configuration errors 
of user/service providers. Cloud’s vulnerabilities expose the 
confidentiality, integrity or/and availability of its resources. 
This is because that data and virtualised infrastructure of cloud 
systems can be breached by existing and new attacks [5]. The 
security challenge of a cloud computing system occurs when a 
cloud runs a high storage capacity and computing power that 
is abused by an insider or outsider hacker [6]. 
 
    There are some existing security techniques and tools, 
including authentication, access control, encryption, access 
control, firewall and intrusion detection systems (IDSs), to 
tackle the cloud’s security issues. However, in current cloud 
computing systems, no single mechanism fits all cases of 
exploitation. These mechanisms should be incorporated to 
produce a comprehensive layer of defence. In this study, we 
mainly focus on the IDS technology and what is the suitable 
framework for detecting intrusive events that threaten cloud 
environments.  
 
    We propose a Collaborative Anomaly Detection Framework 
(CADF) for processing big data of cloud computing systems. 
More specifically, we provide the technical functions and the 
 way of deployment of this proposed framework for these 
environments. The technical framework comprises three 
modules: capturing and logging network data, pre-processing 
these data and a new Decision Engine (DE) using a Gaussian 
Mixture Model (GMM) [15] and lower-upper Interquartile 
Range (IQR) threshold [16] for detecting attacks. The UNSW-
NB15 dataset1 is used for evaluating the new DE to assess its 
reliability while deploying the framework in real cloud 
computing systems.   
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
     Because of the dynamic configurations of cloud computing, 
numerous vulnerabilities attempt to penetrate its architecture, 
leaving loopholes in which attackers exploit cloud’s services 
and its big data [2]. The analysis of cloud data should consider 
the inspection of big data properties, i.e., volume, velocity, 
variety, veracity and value, for efficiently detecting malicious 
activities [7]. Inspecting these properties in cloud data helps in 
making the decision of designing a scalable security 
mechanism that can precisely model network data for defining 
malicious patterns, and these properties are declared as 
follows. 
 Volume is a large amount of processed data. 
 Velocity is the high speed of processed data. 
 Variety is the dimensionality of processed data. 
 Veracity is the correctness of processed data. 
 Value is the significance of processed data.  
 
   An IDS is widely used to detect intrusive activities from 
cloud’s big data, but it still faces the challenge of successfully 
recognising invariants of known attacks and zero-day/new 
malicious activities. The purpose of IDS is to provide a layer 
of defence against malicious events that try to breach 
computing systems. It monitors and analyses activities which 
happen in computer or network systems to detect possible 
threats [1].  
 
   The IDS detection approaches are classified into three 
categories: misuse- (MDS), anomaly- (ADS) and hybrid-based 
IDS, merging the first two types [1][5][7]. A MDS monitors 
network data to match observed activities against an existing 
blacklist. Nevertheless, although it produces high detection 
rates and low false positive rates, it cannot identify any zero-
day attacks or even variants of known ones [5]. Conversely, an 
ADS establishes a normal profile and discovers any variation 
from it as an attack. Because it can identify both known and 
unknown attacks, it is a better approach than a MDS if its 
detection method is properly developed [1] [5] [3].  
                                                          
1The UNSW-NB15 dataset,  https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/australian-centre-
for-cyber-security/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-Datasets/ , May 2015 
   The majority of recent cloud computing IDS research 
focuses on its design at the application, platform, and 
infrastructure layers separately [6]. For instance, Gustavo and 
Miguel [8] executed many ADS techniques and suggested an 
IDS for protecting complex web applications as SaaS. Their 
results showed that the deployment of ADS at the application 
layer is very effective, as it is easy to detect application 
attacks. Nevertheless, they did not provide an effective way of 
deploying their system in a real cloud computing environment.  
 
    Establishing the IDS in the infrastructure layer is important 
to some extent. As in [9], the authors suggested a hypervisor 
model based on a VM monitor to secure the infrastructure 
layer (IaaS) from different types of attacks. This model 
enhances the reliability and availability of the system because 
the running services can be protected. However, this model 
cannot protect the system if the infrastructure collapses due to 
the norm of contemporary flooding traffic of attacks such as 
DDoS. 
 
     Designing a collective IDS structure for cloud computing 
systems is always an arduous task because of their 
heterogeneous model and virtualisation technology. Zayed et 
al. [10] developed a collaborative IDS using a support vector 
machine technique for detecting abnormal activities. However, 
this system is not scalable as the performance drops with the 
increase of data capacity into the central node in which a 
single point of failure is unsuitable in the cloud.  
 
    Gai et al. [11] suggested a grid and cloud computing IDS 
for discovering malicious events. However, this system can 
only detect particular attacks. Tan et al. [2] proposed a 
collective IDS which associates malicious events between 
different IDSs to enhance the IDS efficiency. Although these 
collaborative systems are scalable to some extent, they cannot 
efficiently detect large-scale distributed anomalies, and there 
is no central correlation handler to merge activities, as we 
propose in this study. 
III. PROPOSED COLLABORATIVE ANOMALY DETECTION 
FRAMEWORK (CADF) 
    Existing misuse IDSs are not able to identify zero-day 
attacks or even variants of existing types. The design of a 
collaborative IDS for each node in cloud computing 
environments is extremely significant for detecting these types 
of intrusions. A Collaborative Anomaly Detection Framework 
(CADF) is proposed to detect malicious observations from 
each network node in order to considerably improve the 
detection accuracy.  
 
     The target of the framework is to develop an effective ADS 
installed in each node in cloud computing systems which 
identifies malicious activities with a central data capturing and 
logging module. We describe the technical functions and 
deployment of this framework to understand the way of 
implementing it in real environments. The technical 
framework involves three modules, capturing and logging, 
data pre-processing and decision engine for identifying 
suspicious activities of cloud, as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed Collaborative Anomaly Detection Framework (CADF) 
A. Capturing and logging module 
    This module includes the steps of sniffing network data and 
storing them to be processed by the DE technique, like the 
steps of designing the UNSW-NB15 dataset [12] [13]. The 
configuration of the UNSW-NB15 testbed was used to 
simulate a large-scale network. A tcpdump tool was applied to 
sniff packets from the network’s interface while Bro, Argus 
tools and other scripts were used to extract a set of features 
from network flows 12] [13]. These features were recorded 
using the MySQL Cluster CGE technology2 that has a highly 
scalable and real-time database and enables a distributed 
architecture to read and write intensive workloads, and is 
accessed via SQL APIs for processing big data. 
B. Pre-processing module 
    This module determines and filters network data in three 
steps. Firstly, its feature conversion replaces non-numeric 
features with numeric ones because our GMM-based ADS 
technique deals with only numeric features, for example 
mapping TCP, UDP and ICMP into 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
Secondly, its feature reduction uses the PCA technique to 
                                                          
2 The MySQL CGE technology, https://www.mysql.com/products/cluster/ , 
May 2017. 
select a small number of uncorrelated features. Because this is 
one of the best-known linear feature reduction algorithms, 
with the advantages of demanding less memory storage, 
having lower data transfer and processing times, and better 
accuracy than others [14], we used it for this study.  
 
    Finally, feature normalisation arranges the value of each 
feature in a certain range to remove any bias from raw data 
and easily process it. We apply the z-score function, as it can 
scale the network data with no change in the norm of the 
original data. It scales each feature ( ) with a 0 mean ( ) and 
1 standard deviation ( ), to normalise the data using (1). 
 
                                          (1) 
IV. DECISION ENGINE MODULE  
   This section elaborates the new DE technique based on the 
Gaussian mixture model and lower-upper interquartile range 
baseline.    
 
A. Finite Mixture Model using Gaussian distribution 
    As a finite mixture model is defined as a convex 
combination of two or more Probability Density Functions 
(PDFs), the joint properties of these functions can approximate 
any arbitrary distribution. It is a powerful and flexible 
probabilistic modeling technique for multivariate data [15]. 
Network data are typically considered multivariate as they 
have d dimensions for differentiating between attack and 
normal instances; for example, let  be a d-
dimensional random variable and  an 
observation of X. The probability density Function (PDF) of a 
Gaussian distribution is computed by 
                         (2) 
   where  is feature values,  is mean of the distribution and 
 is variance. The PDF of a mixture model is declared by a 
convex combination of -component PDFs and is given as  
 
                         (3) 
 
   where ( )  are the mixing proportions, each  is a 
set of parameters defining the  components which are based 
on the number of the feature selected using the PCA technique 
and  is the complete set of 
parameters required to identify the mixture. Applying the 
probability conditions,  has to satisfy  
 
        (4) 
 
     The mixture model is computed by the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [15]. Assuming  data with  
observations, the probability of data in which  are 
identically and independently distributed is given by  
 
     (5) 
 
The MLE is derived from the set of parameters ( ) by 
 
          (6) 
 
   The GMM is the mixture model most often applied for 
NADSs. It estimates the PDFs (from equations (2) to (6)) of 
the normal data given by a training set. The parameters 
 of the GMM are estimated using the EM 
algorithm to model network data.  
B. Training Phase 
 
    It is vital to obtain a purely normal training set to assert 
correct detection. Given a set of normal vectors ( ) in 
which each record comprises a set of features, 
where , the normal profile 
contains only statistical measures from . They involve 
the estimated parameters of the GMM to 
compute the PDFs of the Gaussian distribution 
( ) for each vector in the training set, as shown 
in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. Sample of density curves for normal network data  
 
    Algorithm 1 presents the proposed steps for establishing a 
normal profile (pro), with the parameters (  ) of the 
GMM estimated for all the normal vectors ( ) using the 
equations published in [15], and then the PDFs of the features 
( ) are calculated using equations (2) to (6). Following this, 
the IQR is calculated by subtracting the first quartile 
subtracted from the third quartile of the PDFs [16] to generate 
a threshold for identifying abnormal instances in the testing 
phase.  It is known that quartiles divide data into contiguous 
intervals with equal probabilities [16]. 
 
Algorithm1: generation of normal profile in training phase 
Input: normal vectors ( ) 
Output: normal profile (pro) 
1. for each record i  in  ( )  do  
2. estimate the parameters ( ) of the GMM  
3. compute the PDFs using equations (2) to (6) based on the 
parameters estimated in Step 2 
4. end for 
5. calculate   lower = quartile (PDFs,1)  
6. calculate   upper = quartile (PDFs,3)  
7. calculate   IQR = upper - lower 
8. pro       {( ), (lower-upper IQR)} 
9. return pro 
C. Testing Phase 
     In the testing phase, the Gaussian PDF ( ) of 
each vector ( ) is calculated using the same parameters 
computed for the normal profile ( ). Algorithm 2 describes 
the steps in the testing phase and decision-making method for 
specifying the Gaussian PDFs of attack records, with step 1 
building the PDF of each vector using the stored normal 
parameters ( ). 
 
Algorithm 2: testing phase and decision-making method 
Input: observed record ( ) 
      , normal profile (pro) {( ), (lower-upper IQR)} 
Output:  normal or abnormal record 
1. compute the PDFtesting  using equations 2 to 6 with parameters ( 
) 
2. if  (PDFtesting  < (lower –w.(IQR))) || (PDFtesting  > (upper + w. 
(IQR)) then   
3.     return attack 
4. else 
5.    return normal 
6. end if 
 
   Steps 2 to 6 are the steps of the decision-making method. 
The IQR of the normal vectors is calculated to find the 
anomalies of any testing record ( ) which are considered 
to be any vector falling below (lower – w.(IQR)) or above 
(upper + w.(IQR)), where w is interval values between 1.5 and 
3 that precisely represents the lower and upper bounds of 
normal data, as proven in [16]. The detection decision is based 
on considering any PDFtesting falling outside of this interval as 
anomalies, otherwise they are normal records. 
V. DEPLOYMENT OF PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR CLOUD 
COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS 
 
   The deployment of this framework is described for three 
nodes (A, B and C) depicted in Figure 3 in order to be 
executed for cloud computing systems. Unlike traditional 
IDSs, the CADF is deployed on each network node and each 
CADF connected simultaneously with the shared module of 
capturing and logging. This is for collecting attribute values of 
 network traffic in a particular time interval to make it much 
easier while passing the processed data to the DE module for 
each network node. 
 
    We suggest the deployment in two stages: a shared module 
as SaaS and ADS as SaaS. The first includes a sensor for 
capturing network attributes and logging them in a data 
source, as presented in Figure 3. It is designed to be a sharable 
service for the entire connected ADSs at different cloud nodes. 
The second contains the main functionality of the proposed 
ADS to be installed at each node for handling large-scale 
networks by distributing it as service at each node.   
 
 
Figure 3. Deployment architecture of CADF 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EXPLANATIONS 
A. Dataset and pre-prosessing module used for evaluation 
 
    The evaluation of the proposed framework is conducted 
using the UNSW-NB15 dataset which has a hybrid of 
authentic contemporary normal and attack vectors. The 
volume of its network packets is nearly 100 Gigabytes, 
generating 2,540,044 observations which are recorded in four 
CSV files. Each record includes 47 features and the class 
label. The dataset comprises ten different classes, one normal 
and nine types of security events and malware (i.e., Analysis, 
Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Fuzzers 
for anomalous activity, Shellcode and Worms). The GMM-
ADS technique is evaluated using 10 features selected from 
the UNSW-NB15 dataset selected using the PCA, as presented 
in Table I. 
 
   Table  I.  FEATURES SELECTED FROM UNSW-NB15 DATASET 
 
ct_dst_sport_ltm, tcprtt, dwin, ct_src_dport_ltm, 
ct_dst_src_ltm, ct_dst_ltm, smean, dmean, service, proto 
 
    The proposed technique was developed using the ‘R 
language’ on Linux Ubuntu 14.04 with 16 GB RAM and an i7 
CPU processor. To conduct the experiments on the dataset, we 
selected random samples from the CSV files of the UNSW-
NB15 dataset with various sample sizes between 70,000 and 
150,000. In each sample, normal records were about 60-70% 
of the total size, with some used for establishing the normal 
profile and the testing set. 
B. Performance Evaluation  
 
     The accuracy, Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate 
(FPR) explained below are used to evaluate the framework 
performance.  
 The accuracy is the percentage of all normal and attack 
records correctly classified, that is, 
    (7) 
 The DR is the percentage of correctly detected attack 
records, that is, 
    (8) 
 The FPR is the percentage of incorrectly detected attack 
records, that is, 
     (9) 
 
  where TP  (true positive) is the number of actual attack 
records classified as attacks, TN (true negative) is the number 
of actual normal records classified as normal, FN (false 
negative) is the number of actual attack records classified as 
normal and FP (false positive) is the number of actual normal 
records classified as attacks.  
C. Result discussion 
    The performance evaluation of the CADF was conducted on 
the features selected from the UNSW-NB15 dataset, with the 
overall DR, accuracy and FPR values demonstrated in Table 
II. Figure 4 presents the Receiver Operating Characteristics 
(ROC) curves which display the relationship between the DRs 
and FPRs using the w values.   
 
 Table II.  Evaluation of features from unsw-NB15 dataset 
w value DR Accuracy FPR 
1.5 86.3% 88.2% 8.4% 
2 89.1% 90.1% 5.5% 
2.5 93.4% 94.8% 4.4% 
3 95.6% 96.7% 3.5% 
 
    It can be seen that the stable increase in the w value 
between 1.5 and 3 increased the overall DR and accuracy 
while decreasing the overall FPR. The overall DR and 
accuracy increased from 86.3% to 95.6 % and 88.2% and 
96.7%, respectively, however the overall FPR decreased from 
8.4 % to 3.5% when the w value increased from 1.5 to 3. 
 
    The key reasons for the CADF performing better than the 
other peer techniques discussed below are that the GMM can 
perfectly fit the boundaries of each feature as it accurately 
 estimates the mixing weights of network features in order to 
model normal data. Moreover, the lower-upper IQR method 
can successfully specify the boundaries between normal and 
outlier observations. 
 
Figure 4. ROC curves with w values 
 
    The performance evaluation results for the CADF were 
compared with three existing techniques, namely the Triangle 
Area Nearest Neighbours (TANN) [17], Euclidean Distance 
Map (EDM) [18] and Multivariate Correlation Analysis 
(MCA) [19], with their overall DRs and FPRs listed in Table 
III, revealing the superiority of our framework . 
 
Table III. Comparison of performances of four techniques  
Technique DR FPR 
TANN [17] 88.2% 12.3% 
EDM [18] 89.4% 10.6% 
MCA [19] 91.4% 8.9% 
Proposed CADF 95.6% 3.5 % 
 
     According to the above discussions, the proposed 
framework can be easily deployed in cloud computing 
systems. Since the shared module as SaaS collects important 
network observations from different network nodes, the DE as 
SaaS does not consume high processing time to inspect the 
observations, either normal or attacks, for these nodes. This is 
because the DE was built based on only estimating statistical 
measures of Gaussian mixture model and lower-upper 
interquartile range from network instances that can be simply 
computed in real cloud computing systems with less 
computational resources.  
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
    This study discusses a new collaborative anomaly detection 
framework for detecting known and unknown intrusive 
activities in cloud computing environments. This framework 
comprises capturing and logging network data, pre-processing 
these data to be handled at the decision engine sensor and a 
new decision engine using the Gaussian Mixture model and 
interquartile range for identifying abnormal patterns. 
Moreover, the architecture for deploying this framework as 
Software as a Service (SaaS) is produced in order to be easily 
installed in cloud computing systems. The experimental 
results of the framework show its superiority for detecting 
abnormal events using the UNSW-NB15 dataset compared 
with three ADS techniques. In future, we plan to extend this 
study for deploying the framework in a real cloud computing 
environment with further findings and explanations.  
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